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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, in the
interest of,

:
Case No. 870578-CA

W.D.,

:

Priority No. 13

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code

Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a), (5) (Supp. 1988) and R. Utah S. Ct. 42
(1989) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the

Juvenile Court's yield of jurisdiction to California where the
parties had substantial connections to California?
2.

Whether petitioners where denied due process when

the Court of Appeals affirmed the Juvenile Court finding, at a
hearing subsequent to W.D.'s transfer, that it would have yielded
jurisdiction to California even if the hearing had

occurred

prior to W.D.'s transfer?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State concurs with the facts set forth by the Court
of Appeals in its opinion in In Re W.D. v. Drakef 103 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1989).

Any facts pertinent to the

determination of this petition and not referenced by the Court of

Appeals are detailed in the relevant portions of the argument
below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners were not a Utah family at the time the
Juvenile Court yielded jurisdiction to California.

Petitioners

and W.D. had substantial connections with California and
declination of jurisdiction by Utah was proper at the time.
Thus, the Court of Appeals opinion, based upon the record
evidence before it, properly affirmed the lower court's order.
Even though W.D.'s transfer to California without a prior Utah
hearing initially infringed petitioners' due process rights,
subsequent hearings established that the Juvenile Court would
have yielded jurisdiction to California if a hearing had been
held at the time of the transfer and it was not an abuse of
discretion to decline jurisdiction after W.D.'s transfer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECLINED JURISDICTION AFTER
FINDING THAT UNDER THE SIGNIFICANT
CONNECTIONS PROVISION OF THE UCCJA THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA WAS THE MOST APPROPRIATE AND
CONVENIENT FORUM IN WHICH TO LITIGATE THE
CUSTODY OF W.D.
Initially, the State agrees with petitioners' assertion
that the Court of Appeals was correct in determining that the
most appropriate forum in which to litigate the custody of W.D.
depended upon the best interests of the child, in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. S 78-45c-7(3) (1987).

However, petitioners'

further interpretation of this section is incorrect.

-2-

Petitioners

suggest that all five factors listed under this section must be
reviewed before a determination of the best interests of the
child is made; but a closer reading of the statute reveals that
the extent of the review of each of the listed factors is left to
the discretion of the court.

The language of this section

(3) In determining if it is an
inconvenient forum, the court shall consider
if it is in the interest of the child that
another state assume jurisdiction. For this
purpose it may take into account the
following factors, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was
the child's home state;
(b) if another state has a closer
connection with the child and his family or
with one or more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships is more readily available in
another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on
another forum which is no less appropriate;
and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court of this state would contravene any of
the purposes stated in § 78-45c-l.
(Emphasis added.) Although petitioners characterize the Court of
Appeals' analysis as Mcursory and sloppy" (see petitioner's brief
at 5), the opinion demonstrates careful consideration of the
lower court's exercise of discretion in determining that the best
interests of the child would be served by yielding jurisdiction
to California based upon the significant connections that the
state of California had with the baby and his family.

Subsection

(c) of Utah Code Ann. S78-45c-l (1987) explains that one purpose
of the UCCJA is to:

-3-

(c) assure that litigation concerning
the custody of a child take place ordinarily
in the state in which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships is most readily available, and
that courts of this state decline the
exercise of jurisdiction when the child and
his family have a closer connection with
another state.
This need for significant evidence and close connection with the
state that will ultimately exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
has been addressed by a variety of jurisdictions and cases.

In

the Matter of Custody of Ross, 630 P.2d 353, 357 (Oregon 1981),
the Court refers to the UCCJA when it states that "the purpose
which pervades the Act is to provide that the child custody
determination will be made in the state where there is optimum
access to evidence."

This "optimum access to evidence"

requirement is reflected in Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3 (1987),
which explains the "home state" test, as well as the "significant
connections" test.

Logically, then, the purpose of the various

factors is to give some guidance to courts of possible avenues to
use in determining which state will have "optimum access to
evidence' and thus be in the best interests of the child; rather
than simply a list of several prongs which must be met.
Although the court noted that Utah may qualify as the
-home state" of W.D. since he was born here, it chose not to
decide that issue as it determined that the best interests of the
child would be served if it looked to the significant connections
between the child, his family, and the state of California.
Court of Appeals explained:

•4-

The

the Utah UCCJA does not give preference to
the "home state." The significant connection
or substantial connection basis "comes into
play either when the home state test cannot
be met or as an alternative to that test.M 9
UCCJA (U.L.A.) S3 comment, 144 (1988)
(emphasis added). Even though a certain
state may be the "home state," if "the child
and his family have equal or stronger ties
with another state" that other state also has
jurisdiction. Ijd. ; see also Smith v. Superior
Court of San Mateo County, 68 Cal.App.3d 457,
137 Cal.Rptr. 348, 352 (1977). Therefore,
the fact that Utah may technically have "home
state" jurisdiction will not prevent
California from also having jurisdiction
under the "substantial connection" basis.
In re W.D. v. Drake, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (1989).

Thus, the

court turned its attention to the substantial connections between
the child, his family, and California in accordance with Utah
Code Ann §78-45c-3(1)(b) (1987) which provides:
(b) It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection
with this state, and (ii) there is available
in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships;
Petitioners' brief suggests that the only "connection"
California had with the child and his family occurred as a result
of California's petition and the subsequent transportation of the
child to that state (see petitioner's brief at 6). However, the
facts in this case, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
reveal that the connections existing at the time of the
jurisdictional dispute were more substantial.

As the Court of

Appeals noted, "the facts and circumstances considered are those
in existence when the petition was filed. Rexford v. Rexford, 631
-5-

P.2d 475, 478 (Alaska 1980)." 103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, n.2.
When Christine Drake gave birth to W.D. on August 24, 1987, the
physical presence of the child and his parent were the sole
connections that these two had to the state of Utah.

All of the

child's personal relations, including father William Mick, the
baby's maternal grandmother and two maternal aunts, and W.D.'s
only sibling, Ingrid, lived in California (T. 231-33).

Although

petitioners repeatedly refer to themselves as a "Utah family,' no
relatives except W.D.'s mother, Christine Drake, lived in Utah at
the time surrounding this dispute, and Drake did not have any
sort of permanent or even temporary residence in Utah.

Between

her arrival in Utah on August 1, 1987 and the birth of W.D. on
August 24, 1987, Drake had lived in two motels and one apartment.
(T. 211-14).

Four days following the birth, she was evicted from

the apartment for nonpayment and subsequently spent several days
at a women's shelter. (T. 216-19).

In contrast, the court noted

that:
Drake and Mick had lived in California
for several years. W.D. was conceived and
carried nearly to term there. At the time
the petition in California was filed, Mick
was still living in San Francisco and Drake
had only left to find another state with more
favorable custody laws. Under these
circumstances Drake, Mick and W.D. all had
substantial connections with California,
thereby meeting the first requirement of the
substantial connection test. Additionally,
California authorities had information on the
parents' mode of living, psychological
makeup, marital relationship, parenting
skills, and past interrelationship with
W.D.'s older sister. This was enough to meet
the required need of substantial evidence on
W.D.'s care, protection, training, and
relationships to satisfy the second
requirement.
-6-

103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27 (1989).

Petitioners suggest that the

court's determination was flawed in that the child had never been
physically present in California until he was transported to the
state of California after the petition had been filed.

However,

Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(3) (1987) specifically directs that
"physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a
prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody."
Petitioners' dependence on the physical presence of the child as
a necessary element for the "significant connections" test
demonstrates their misunderstanding of the court's distinction
between the "home state" analysis and the variety of factors
which combine to establish substantial or significant connections
necessary for a court to claim appropriate forum jurisdiction, or
for one state to decline jurisdiction in favor of another forum.
Petitioners also submit that the evidence possessed by
the state of California concerning W.D.'s parents and family does
not pertain to W.D.'s present or future care, as required by the
statute. (See petitioner's brief at 7,8). However, the evidence
available in California about the parents and their eldest child
served as a proper indicator of present and future care of W.D..
The information regarding the parents' mode of living,
psychological states, parenting skills, and relationship with
W.D.'s sibling in California was the clearest, and perhaps only,
indicator of "the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships."

Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-

While Judge Orme in his dissent notes that the family now
resides in Utah, that fact was not before the Juvenile Court at
the time it yielded jurisdiction to California.
-7-

3(l)(b)(ii) (1987).

This is especially true in light of the fact

that at the time of the petition, such indicators were painfully
lacking in the state of Utah.

In fact, one of the reasons that

Pat Rothermick, of the State Protective Services, did not feel
comfortable releasing W.D. to his mother is that besides not
having a place of her own (she told Rothermick that she was
staying with friends), she did not have a baby bed, baby clothes,
baby food, or any evidence that she was prepared to assume the
responsibilities of caring for a child. (T. 15). She even asked
Rothermick to lend her $5.00. (T. 18). Petitioners' statement
that "because the mother and the father intended to continue to
live in Utah with the child and because they intended to keep the
child and care for him in Utah, all evidence concerning the
child's present and future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships was in Utah" (see Petition at 8) and other
references to this family as a "Utah family" (see petitioner's
brief at 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14) misrepresent the facts at the
time of the Juvenile Court hearings in question, and offer no
insight as to the question of "significant connections."

If the

facts have changed since the initiation of this case, petitioners
should approach the Juvenile Courts requesting to move
jurisdiction of this case from California to Utah.

Continuing

this attack of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which must
be reviewed upon the facts at the time of the petition is not the
2
appropriate means to introduce new evidence into the case.
2
The second point in the Petition asserts that the Court of
Appeals' analysis is "haIf-baked" in that it does not recognize
the rights of W.D.'s parents as Utah citizens with the result
-8-

Petitioners' final complaint concerning the Court of
Appeals' opinion and analysis of the UCCJA is that the
definitional section of the federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA) was misconstrued as not applying to child
neglect and dependency proceedings.

(See Petition at 8).

The

court cites to the case of State ex rel. Dep't. of Human Serv. v.
Avinger, 104 N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290, 292 (1986) for the
proposition that the PKPA does not apply to child dependency and
neglect proceedings.

103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, n.l (1989).

In

that case, the New Mexico Supreme Court identifies that "the
legislative history of the PKPA demonstrates that the primary
purpose of the PKPA is to prevent 'child snatching' by parents
across state lines."

Id. at 292. Further, the New Mexico

Supreme Court held that "the history of the PKPA stresses the
importance of preventing 'child snatching' and does not contain
any reference to child neglect and dependency proceedings.

This

legislative history demonstrates that there was an absence of
Congressional intent to apply the PKPA to child neglect and
dependency proceedings."

Ld.

Based upon this case, the Court of

Appeals came to the logical conclusion that the PKPA was "not
important to the resolution of this case."
28, n.l (1989).

103 Utah Adv. Rep. at

Petitioners cite an earlier case decided by the

Cont. that MUtah parents deprived of the custody of their
child cannot litigate the matter in a Utah court." (See
petitioner's brief at 9-11). As a result, petitioners argue, the
fundamental rights to travel and to sustain the relationship
between parents and child have been violated. This argument
ignores that the facts which existed at the time of the hearings
do not permit recognition of W.D. and his parents as a "Utah
family.-9-

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Matter of Pima County Juvenile
Action, 147 Ariz, 527, 711 P.2d 1200, 1206 (1985), and urge that
"a more thorough analysis of the PKPA and its language would
likely lead to the opposite conclusion, as the Arizona Court of
Appeals held" in that case.

(See petitioner's brief at 9). Yet,

petitioners fail to provide the "more thorough analysis" they
recommend.

The Arizona case held that "in absence of any finding

that Arkansas no longer had jurisdiction or had declined to
exercise jurisdiction, juvenile court's order in dependency
proceedings which awarded legal custody of children to Department
of Economic Security was a modification of prior Arkansas custody
decree contrary to provisions of Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act [28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A] and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act [A.R.S. §§ 8-401 to 8-424]."

711 P.2d at 1201 (1985).

The

fact that Utah, in this case, did decline jurisdiction,
distinguishes the case at hand and suggests the inapplicability
of the PKPA to the present facts, as was determined by the court
in the present matter.

In addition to petitioners' lack of

analysis on this issue, petitioners failed to raise this claim to
the Court of Appeals and that failure should bar review of the
matter as part of the petition for certiorari.

In State v.

Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983) the Court held that it will
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

This is

consistent with a policy of allowing the trial court the
opportunity to remedy errors itself.

By analogy, for the same

policy reasons, the issue of whether the PKPA should control the
jurisdictional issue in this case should not be reviewed as part
of a petition for certiorari.
-10-

POINT II
PETITIONERS WERE NOT DEPRIVED OF THEIR DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS BY UTAH'S RELEASE OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN FAVOR OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA AS THE APPROPRIATE AND CONVENIENT
FORUM FOR THIS DISPUTE.
Petitioners submit that "the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in this case essentially states that the Utah courts must
decline jurisdiction in UCCJA cases regardless of the manner in
which the other state handles the case and whether or not the
other state's actions are taken in accordance with the UCCJA, due
process and principles of fairness."
12).

(See petitioner's brief at

This reading of the court's decision is unwarranted.

In a

footnote, the Court of Appeals stated that:
Although we cannot condone the manner in
which W.D. was taken to California before
Judge Matheson declined jurisdiction, nor the
misstatement of information contained in the
California petition, we believe the
subsequent hearings provided the parents
adequate due process to protect their rights.
See In re Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d
608, 610 (Utah 1980) .
103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, n.3 (1989).

The Court of Appeals at no

time rules that regardless of the procedures employed, Utah
courts must decline jurisdiction in favor of competing state
claims to jurisdiction.

In fact, the Court of Appeal's summary

of the facts provides evidence that petitioners were sufficiently
represented at both the California hearings and Utah hearings, or
else were given an opportunity to initiate further action.
at 26.

Ld.

For this reason, the court distinguishes the present

action from situations in which the due process violations have
not been remedied by subsequent proceedings and prevents such a
broad application of this case as petitioner suggests.
-11-

To hold that petitioners rights to due process were
violated at this juncture of the proceedings does no more than
punish California for its initial procedural defaults.

Although

the State admits that initially, the inappropriate action of
transferring the child before Utah declined jurisdiction was a
violation of due process, the State agrees with the Court of
Appeals that this violation was successfully remedied by
subsequent court actions.

The record shows that even had W.D.

remained in Utah until after the Utah hearing, the Juvenile Court
would still have determined that California had substantial
connections, and would have declined jurisdiction.

Thus, the end

result would not have varied, even if strict procedural rules had
been followed.
Petitioners' final argument is based upon the claim
that "this is a contest between Utah parents and a California
social services agency."

(See petitioners' brief at 13).

Because the facts do not support the claim that this family may
be characterized as a "Utah family" at the time of the hearing,
petitioners' argument is without support.

Even in Judge Orme's

concurring and dissenting opinion, when he suggests that the
appropriate action would have been for the Utah Court to simply
stay the proceeding rather than to dismiss it entirely, he states
that Hall things considered, California may have initially seemed
the sensible forum to exercise jurisdiction." Ld. at 28,29. His
purpose in asserting that the Utah court should have stayed the
proceeding as authorized by Utah Code Ann. S78-45c-7(5) (1987) is
that the court then could have reasserted jurisdiction if

-12-

subsequent actions of the petitioners so warranted.

However, in

the event that petitioners terminate this appeal for review of
the present decision, they may return to the trial court and move
for a change of jurisdiction to the state of Utah if the present
facts prove that such action is appropriate#
CONCLUSION
Petitioners assert that certiorari should be granted,
however, they have failed to establish any grounds upon which
this Court should exercise its discretion to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals and the State requests that the Petition
be denied.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /oM

day of May, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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